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I. Introduction
Since its formation in 1960 from the union of British Somaliland and
Italian Somaliland, the Somali Republic was always dependent on foreign aid to balance its operations and development budgets. In each of
the three years after independence, the Republic financed 31 percent
of its budget with grants from its former colonizers: Britain and Italy.1
General Mohamed Siad Barre’s socialist military regime of 1969–1991
heavily depended on financial and technical support from the U.S.S.R.
until disagreement about the 1977–78 war between Somalia and Ethiopia disrupted the relationship. Due to Somalia’s strategic location and
the Cold War, Siad Barre was able to replace the financial loss caused
by the departure of the U.S.S.R. with aid from the United States, Saudi
Arabia, and countries in Western Europe.
The 1977–78 war and its aftermath caused the displacement of a
large number of Somali-Ethiopians who sought refuge in Somalia. Siad
Barre’s regime received massive humanitarian support to resettle the
displaced people in refugee camps in Somalia. However, most of the
food was diverted to supplement the income of Somali soldiers or was
used to fuel the Western Somali Liberation Front’s war against Ethiopia.2 Siad Barre also received financial and military support from the
U.S. and other countries in the West to repel armed and largely clanbased movements against his regime. By 1990, just before it fell, Siad
Barre’s government was getting annual financial support of $100 million (second only to Egypt and Israel) from the U.S.3
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When the regime fell in 1991, the clan-based rebel groups took control of the majority of the regions in the country and civil conflict
erupted. Bi-lateral aid dried up, but humanitarian aid still continued, albeit in an inconsistent and uncoordinated manner. The United
Nations and the U.S. both intervened in Somalia in 1992, presumably
to facilitate the delivery of food to starving Somalis. Due to significant
casualties, however, both withdrew by 1995. Since then, the international community has only haphazardly and without coordinated or
well-thought-out plans intervened in Somalia.4
Lately, the U.S. and European Union countries have taken a more
active role, fearing that Somalia has become a safe haven for terrorists.
The U.S. also links the current powerful group al-Shabaab to al-Qaeda.5
A Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was set up in 2004, and since
then has been struggling to keep any sort of power, even over most
of Mogadishu. It controls parts of the capital, with al-Shabaab largely
controlling Southern Somalia. Conditions are not improving due to
insecurity, the difficulty of humanitarian aid reaching those in need,
and/or mismanagement and serious corruption.6 Still, United Nations
agencies and national humanitarian actors report annual humanitarian
and development budgets for Somalia.
This article discusses the nature of foreign aid to Somalia and the
efficacy and transparency issues that surround it. Emphasis is placed
on the aid that currently enters the country. The essay concludes that
foreign aid has not achieved its stated objectives and suggests that an
aid paradigm shift is necessary. It argues that a program that includes
the development of the rule of law, property rights, and legal empowerment of the poor would yield better results than traditional approaches
to aid provision for development. If supplemented with foreign and
domestic policies conducive to trade, these measures could improve
the tax base of any reconstructive government.
II. Rationale and Sources of Current Foreign Aid to Somalia
In 2011, for the fourth year, Somalia is judged as the most acutely failed
state in the world.7 A failed state is a country characterized by poverty,
insecurity, and a disregard for human rights. In introducing this year’s
current ranking, Foreign Policy wrote, “Somalia’s unending woes are the
stuff hopelessness is made of.” The purchasing power parity adjusted
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Somalia is $5.4 billion, or a per capita income of $600, given its population of nine million.8 Somalia ranks
at the bottom of the community of nations regardless of which index is
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Table 1. Aid to Somalia in 2009 and 2010
Source
UNDP
UNICEF Somalia
USAID Somalia
WFP

2009

2010

Reference

$ 48,767,208
$ 79,000,000
$411,186,000
$482,529,259

$49,534,540
Not yet available
$133,820,000 (only preliminary)
$651,000,000 (Budget)

(UNDP, n.d.)
(UNICEF, n.d.)
(USAID, n.d)
(WFP, n.d)

used. Only 39 percent of the population can read and write;9 life expectancy is merely 50 years;10 and the infant mortality rate is 110 per 1,000
births.11 Furthermore, only 29 percent of the population has access to
clean drinking water and only 30 percent of children are enrolled in
primary schools.12
In both 2009 and 2010, more than 3.2 million people of the nation’s
nine million people required humanitarian aid.13 Since 1991, when the
government of Siad Barre fell, more than 360,000 people have been
killed, many by violence-created famine.14 The misery continues into
the present. In June 2010 alone, intensified fighting between the TFG
and its supporters (including 8,000 AMISON soldiers) on one side and
al-Shabaab and its supporters on the other killed more than 100 people
and displaced more than 270,000, causing the number of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) to reach 1.5 million.15 Given these statistics, it
is difficult to quarrel with the need for both humanitarian and development aid to Somalia. As a result, for the last decade, the annual aid,
including humanitarian, that was supposed to reach Somalia was in
the hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars. Yet the main questions are:
Was the aid effective and was it transparent?
Foreign aid to Somalia from major sources, such as the UNDP, UNICEF, USAID, and WFP, amounted to more than $1 billion in 2009 and
over $800 million in 2010, as shown in Table 1.
The stated objectives of UNDP for such aid include reducing poverty and civil wars and improving peace and security. UNICEF-Somalia focuses on communication for development; youth as agents of
change; protecting children from violence, abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination; and HIV/AIDS awareness, prevention, and control.
In 2010, UNICEF had 210 staff working with Somalia, 50 in Nairobi
and the rest in Somalia. But UNICEF-Somalia is physically located in
Nairobi, Kenya. USAID Somalia focuses on fostering conditions for
sustainable peace, improving delivery of social services, and meeting
humanitarian needs. The World Food Programme (WFP) has similar
objectives to USAID.
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UNDP works with other U.N. agencies in Somalia to carry out three
main programs: Governance, Rule of Law and Society, and Recovery
and Sustainable Livelihoods.16 UNDP states that it uses its budget for
Somalia to build governance programs that help central governments
perform essential functions, such as rebuilding infrastructure, financial
management, and budget development. It also carries on programs
to strengthen law and justice to deal with violence and community
safety, as well as education programs that foster gender equality and
improve maternal health. Both UNICEF and UNDP indicate that they
help reduce poverty and hunger. They try to improve water and sanitation as well.17 However, since these organizations are based in Nairobi, Kenya, there is no guarantee that the amounts allocated to these
programs reach their destinations.
The organizations themselves are documenting the difficulties they
face in delivering the aid. The biggest problem is the security of their
humanitarian aid workers. Aid agencies complain of bandits and militias that target aid workers, loot aid, and carjack vehicles. In early 2010,
WFP had to suspend aid to parts of the southern regions of Somalia
due to insecurity and demands from armed groups.18 In 2010, 625,000
persons in al-Shabaab-held areas required aid. Aid agencies say that,
in general, these al-Shabaab-controlled regions are some of the most
dangerous places for humanitarian workers.19
Another obstacle to providing aid is the recent increase in piracy.
Some countries, the U.S. in particular, are hesitant to provide aid due
to recent links between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda.20 The U.S. is concerned that aid is being diverted to al-Shabaab. Yet even if aid was able
to reach its destination, there is no unanimity that it is good for Somalia (or for that matter any other recipient country).
III. Efficacy of Foreign Aid to Somalia
Foreign aid is supposed to transfer resources and know-how from
richer countries in order to accelerate social and economic development in poorer countries like Somalia. Unfortunately, foreign aid to
Somalia has not produced the expected results. The reasons range
from lack of congruency between the objectives of the donors and
those of successive Somali governments to a disabling incompetence
of those carrying out the projects. In general, the successive governments of Somalia instituted economic policies that could not respond
to economic shocks and crises, and as a result could not foster eco-
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nomic growth.21 Somalia’s economic history is replete with misdirected
and ineffective economic strategic initiatives by the colonial, post-independence, socialist, and IMF-led regimes.22 In addition to the mismatch between the market and the incentives set by the governments
of General Mohamed Siad Barre from 1969–1991, the failure was compounded by conditional loans by the West and the IMF.23 Most of the
time, aid funds were spent on products or services in donor countries
rather than making the purchases locally in Somalia for much less cost.
Therefore, Somalis have not seen the creation of wealth and development that were expected to follow the provision of foreign aid.
A case in point is that Somalia was self-sufficient in food production before the late 1970s when food aid started in earnest after a flood
of refugees arrived from Ethiopia in the aftermath of the 1977–78 war
between Somalia and Ethiopia.24 By 1984, 63 percent of the food consumed in Somalia was imported, a complete reversal of the situation at
independence in 1960 and during the first decade after independence.25
As a result of the massive food aid that arrived with the refugees, grain
prices fell dramatically to such a level that local farmers could not
cover their costs, thus reducing incentives for domestic production.26
Perhaps the most devastating consequences of food aid to Somalia
were the corruption, mismanagement, and lack of accountability and
transparency that it fostered.27 Michael Maren, who went to Somalia
as a food monitor for USAID in 1981, was taken aback by the level of
corruption in food aid distribution. As documented in his book Road to
Hell, he found that two-thirds of the aid was stolen by the military right
from the docks in Mogadishu or from the refugee camps. The reported
number of refugees was also inflated in order to receive more aid. But
he also found that relief organizations were not concerned at all about
whether the food was going to the victims because their primary goal
was to remain financially solvent.
Look forward almost four decades and the military government of
Somalia is no more, but both food aid and non-food aid have accelerated, and the problems still remain. In addition, the use of food and
non-food aid by donors for strategic interest continues. The U.S. is one
of the major donors of aid to Somalia, but it seems that the aid is now
guided more by the strategic concerns to reduce piracy and terrorism rather than development or humanitarian objectives.28 As Table
2 shows, in 2008, humanitarian assistance accounted for 95 percent
of total aid by USAID, while peace and security comprised only 1.2
percent. In 2009, peace and security accounted for 64 percent, while
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Table 2. USAID: Fiscal Years 2008–11, by Objective, in Millions of Dollars
FY 2008
Total

FY 2009
Total

FY 2010
Estimate

FY 2011
Request

262.832

411.186

133.820

84.958

1 Peace and Security
3.035
1.1 Counter-Terrorism
—
1.3 Stabilization Operations and Security
Sector Reform
3.035
1.6 Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation
—
2 Governing Justly and Democratically
1.914
2.1 Rule of Law and Human Rights
—
2.2 Good Governance
1.514
2.3 Political Competition and
Consensus-Building
0.400
2.4 Civil Society
—
3 Investing in People
9.253
3.1 Health
2.748
3.1.6 Maternal and Child Health
0.248
3.1.8 Water Supply and Sanitation
2.500
3.2 Education
6.505
3.2.1 Basic Education
6.505
4 Economic Growth
—
4.6 Private Sector Competitiveness
—
5 Humanitarian Assistance
248.630
5.1 Protection, Assistance and Solutions
248.630

262.658
2.000

113.000
—

65.590
—

247.600
13.058
8.687
—
3.977

104.000
9.000
11.270
0.500
5.220

57.590
8.000
8.550
—
4.000

3.710
1.000
9.055
2.550
1.550
1.000
6.505
6.505
—
—
130.786
130.786

4.550
1.000
6.550
1.550
1.550
—
5.000
5.000
3.000
3.000
TBD
TBD

3.550
1.000
6.550
1.550
1.550
—
5.000
5.000
4.268
4.268
TBD
TBD

TOTAL

USAID Website

humanitarian assistance accounted for 32 percent. The statistics for
2010 were not complete at the time of this writing (June 2011). However, out of $133 million budgeted by USAID for Somalia in fiscal year
2010, $113 million, or 85%, is allocated for peace and security. In fiscal
year 2011, the data is still spotty, but the comparable figure is 77 percent allocated for peace and security. Development seems to have been
quite ignored. Humanitarian assistance is also waning, and not as a
result of improvement in the food situation.
Since the Transitional Federal Government, supported by the U.S.,
is trying to repel attacks from al-Shabaab, which is considered by the
U.S. to be a terrorist group, one may understand the strategic shift in
aid to Somalia. But Somalis seem to be disappointed with the pervasive
ineptitude of the current Somali government. Learned and informed
Somalis with whom I have discussed this situation are by-and-large in
agreement that humanitarian and development aid should not be sacrificed for security support to the TFG, which seems to have neither the
will nor the means to fight al-Shabaab. These Somalis would like to see
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a large portion of the development aid going to more stable parts of
Somalia like Somaliland and Puntland, while providing more humanitarian aid to the southern parts of Somalia.
Other critics of the U.S. and U.N. aid to Somalia base their conclusions on the aid’s general effect on Africa29 and the failure of the $50 billion per year that currently goes to Africa to help improve the standard
of living. George Ayittey believes that the U.S. and U.N. initiatives
are unlikely to help because they are not African solutions. Dambisa
Moyo argues that in the past sixty years, more than one trillion dollars have been transferred to Africa, but the lives of those living there
have not improved. In fact, poverty levels have gone up and growth
rates have gone down. Countries are trapped in a cycle of dependency,
corruption, market distortion, and further poverty.30 Matthew Jallow
contends that foreign aid mostly benefits the ruling elites and enables
corrupt governments. The majority of the funding does not reach the
intended groups. Jallow cites a study in Uganda, which found that of
money designated for schools, only 30 percent reached them. Jallow
also uses the World Bank finding in Somalia in 1998 that concluded
that aid undermined civil society because people became dependent
on foreign food, which depressed local prices and reduced the incentive to grow food. These critics also argue that foreign aid is dictated
by strategic and political goals. Other critics recommend cutting off
humanitarian aid to Somalia and fighting terror.31 Chris Harnisch
argues that humanitarian aid only strengthens terrorist groups that
oppress the people.
IV. Can the Situation be Rectified?
Most of the foreign aid that Somalia currently receives is in the form of
humanitarian aid. In 2010, aid agencies asked for $669 million to help
feed and shelter 3.2 million Somalis who depended on them. However,
some of the supporters of aid to Somalia are bothered by the fact that
these foreign aid agencies are now located in Nairobi. This not only
increases overhead costs, thus reducing the amount that ultimately
reaches Somalia, but it also inhibits the transparency of the delivery
system.
A. Should Aid Agencies be Moved to Somalia?
Aid agencies contend that locating in Nairobi was never their first
choice. They are in Nairobi for the safety of their international workers.
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In early 2010, the World Food Programme had to suspend operations
in Southern Somalia due to insecurity in the region.32 Al-Shabaab also
banned the World Food Programme after receiving complaints from
local farmers about the impact of food aid on their ability to earn a livelihood.33 A recent conference on Somalia in Istanbul, Turkey, concluded
that the environment in Somalia is very volatile and unpredictable and
there is a shortage of humanitarian funding.34
In a typical year, there are about 1,500 aid workers for Somalia with
over half located in Nairobi.35 Somalis deliver the majority of the aid
because the situation is deemed too dangerous for international workers. Local and international staff are targets of killings and kidnappings. Unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan, where private security is used,
aid budgets for Somalia are not large enough to incorporate foreign
private security protection so any protection is provided by the local
area.36
The Somali government has been asking aid agencies to relocate
back to Mogadishu from Nairobi since 2010.37 Somalia’s Humanitarian
Affairs Minister at the time, Mohammad Abdi Ibrahim, asked agencies
to relocate, arguing that they would be better able to provide help from
where it is needed, which is Mogadishu. Analysts believe that the relocation alone would raise hope and increase the employment of Somalis, thus improving economic activity and decreasing the response time
to emergencies.38 The pressure to move to Mogadishu also came from
the former U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, Ambassador Amadou Ould-Abdallah, in early 2010. He argued
that Somalia is not a hopeless case and peace should be relatively
easy to achieve.39 He reasoned that to achieve peace, democratic and
humanitarian efforts must move inside Mogadishu and provide the
TFG with tangible assistance.
Michael Michalski from Doctors Without Borders, who worked in
the Galgaduud region of Somalia (an area that has been off limits to
the U.N. for years), wrote in 2007 that he has seen first-hand the benefits of providing aid from within Somalia and believes that it needs
to be done by all agencies.40 In many ways the situation of Somalia in
2007 was even more dangerous than it is now. Michalski asserted that
humanitarian aid administered from afar breeds a lack of accountability, which causes the community to be suspicious.
It seems that all those who opine on whether aid agencies should
move inside Somalia agree in principle on the desirability of donor
agencies setting up shop in Mogadishu. The disagreement is on
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whether any authority operating in Somalia—including the TFG, the
U.N., and local administrations—can guarantee a normal level of security. Even if the security situation improves, it would be difficult to
convince the employees and heads of those aid agencies to abandon
the fairly comfortable life that they have in Nairobi. Furthermore, the
TFG does not have much bargaining power to demand such a move.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the agencies will move unless a credible
Somali government is set up in Mogadishu. But even if the aid agencies can be convinced to relocate to Mogadishu, that does not eliminate
the corruption and lack of transparency of which both aid officials and
Somali officials have been accused.
B. Should Funds Go Directly to the TFG?
There are arguments that aid funds should go to the Somali Transitional Government directly. Wafula Wamunyinyi, the deputy special representative for the African Union Commission for Somalia,
argued in April 2010 that the government of Somalia did not receive
enough funding to achieve its objectives. He contended that the TFG
has restored sufficient state institutions and accountability, and that
its administration can now handle more funds directly.41 Others also
believe that more accountability can be found through programs such
as the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) contract that the government
entered into in 2009.
The contract stipulates that PwC checks ministers’ spending plans
before they are given the money and follows up to ensure it is spent
transparently.42 PwC planned that a staff of about twenty will be
located in Nairobi and operate in and out of Somalia. Will this contract
prevent money from going into the pockets of corrupt officials and
promote more direct funding to Somalia?
The funds that PwC contracted to track include millions pledged for
health care, education, and security.43 PwC promised that it would set
up a money tracking system so that the government would be able to
take control of its own financial institutions in the long run. However,
PwC did not explain how they were going to accomplish this goal.
PwC Kenya has over 250 employees in the Nairobi and Mombasa
offices.44 The contract stipulated that, while PwC Kenya staff would
go to Mogadishu occasionally, the only people permanently located in
Mogadishu would be local agents that deliver small cash payments and
record them in electronic ledgers.45 To make sure that money is being
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transferred properly, the local staff must obtain receipts and signatures
from the people involved. This would then form the basis for reports
that would go to donors every fifteen days.46 This was designed to
reassure donors who pledged money for TFG operations but who were
slow to release it due to the perception of corruption.47 For its trouble,
PwC would receive a commission of 2–4 percent of all funds that reach
the intended destination.
PwC is the largest accounting firm in the world, with yearly average revenue of over $20 billion. It operates in 148 countries and has
the most experience in international financial affairs among the Big
Four accounting firms (the others being Deloitte, Ernst & Young, and
KPMG). PwC gained additional experience when it was hired to help
the U.N. track aid for the tsunami victims.48
The PwC Kenya office won the Financial Consultancy of the Year
Award in 2008, conferred by the African Investor Investment Awards.
PwC International was selected as the 10th most admired knowledge
enterprise in the world, ahead of other accounting firms.49 However,
PwC also endured its share of scandals around the world. PwC was
involved in the well-publicized Tyco Scandal, in which former Tyco
chief executive L. Dennis Kozlowski and former chief financial officer
Mark H. Swartz were found to have defrauded investors of $600 million and were sentenced to prison terms of 8 to 25 years. In an out-ofcourt settlement in July 2007, PwC agreed to pay $225 million to Tyco
investors for its failure to catch the fraud.50 Shareholders stated that, as
the independent auditor, PwC should have detected the fraud, because
Tyco overstated its income by 5.8 billion from 1999 to 2002.
PwC was also involved in the ChuoAoyama scandal.51 ChuoAoyama
PwC, one of Japan’s largest accounting firms, was ordered in 2006 to
stop providing audits to its largest clients for two months (from July
to August 2006). The firm certified false earnings for cosmetics giant
Kanebo, which falsified financial statements for several years. PwC was
also implicated in the PwC Satyam audit scandal in India.52 Known as
India’s Enron, investors demanded to know how PwC missed the one
billion dollar fraud at Satyam, an IT outsourcing company. A reported
one billion dollar cash pile was only 78 million and the auditors should
have detected it if they had run a check on the group’s bank accounts.
The upshot of this discussion is that the hiring of an international
accounting firm may contribute to the overall credibility of the government’s financial reports but it cannot rule out fraud and corruption.
By definition, international accounting rules, promulgated mostly for

60

Hussein Ahmed Warsame

profit-making entities, are not designed to replace internal homegrown
control systems. And it certainly cannot replace the role of leaders to
set an ethical tone. There is a close connection between corruption and
the ethical mettle set by leaders of government. If the higher echelons
of the TFG and regional administrations demonstrated competency,
ethics, and integrity, then other leaders and their staffs would be more
likely to uphold those values. In Somalia, the efforts expended by top
leaders just to survive and keep their jobs has outweighed all other
efforts, including setting standards for ethical behaviour.
V. Paradigm Shift in Development Aid
A. Emphasis on the Rule of Law
It would be cruel, at this junction in the history of the Somali people,
for anyone to recommend cutting off the humanitarian support that
3.2 million Somalis (36% of the population) depend on for their livelihood. It would also not be practical to suggest that the money spent on
peace and security be eliminated in this era of piracy and al-Shabaab.
Yet, it must be acknowledged that aid, as it has been administered so
far, has failed to reduce poverty or cause a growth in wealth. It has
been argued that part of the failure was due to a constant change of
priorities.53 For example, in the 1960s, aid was supposed to help industrialization; in the 1970s, it had a poverty agenda; in the 1980s, it was to
help in stabilization and liberalization of the economy; in the 1990s, aid
was supposed to help governance; and the 2000s saw what Dambisa
Moyo calls “rise of glamour” aid.54 In this article, however, I suggest
another paradigm change. This time, I proffer that aid to countries
like Somalia should have a legal empowerment objective. In order to
reduce poverty, the poor must be legally empowered.
My suggestions follow the recommendations of the Commission on
Legal Empowerment of the Poor that was set up in 2005 by the United
Nations. The commission was co-chaired by Madeleine K. Albright,
former U.S. Secretary of State, and Hernando De Soto, President of the
Institute for Liberty and Democracy, headquartered in Lima, Peru. It
included such notable members as Lloyd Axworthy, former Minister
of Foreign Affairs for Canada; Benjamin Mkapa, former President of
the United Republic of Tanzania; Mary Robinson, former President of
Ireland and former High Commissioner for Human Rights; Lawrence
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Summers, former U.S. Secretary of Treasury; and Ernesto Zedillo, former President of Mexico. It released its recommendations in 2008.55
The United Nations, through the Millennium Declaration of 2000
and the associated Millennium Development Goals (MDG), has
agreed to cut extreme poverty in half worldwide by the year 2015. Not
addressed explicitly in the MDG is that the vast majority of the world’s
poor, like Somalis, live their daily lives in what is often referred to as
the informal or extralegal sector that is often excluded from the benefits
of a legal order. Poor women and men generally lack effective legal
protection or recognition of their economic assets and transactions.56
The poor in Somalia live in an environment characterized by insecurity
and constrained opportunities for participating in and benefiting from
economic development. Any government installed in Somalia right
now will face lower growth, less revenues, and less room for investing in health, education, and infrastructure, as well as perhaps more
instability and armed conflict. In line with the legal empowerment
commission’s recommendations, it is argued that a central question in
poverty reduction should be how best to unlock the potential of local
assets, entrepreneurship, and institution building. One of the main
impediments to development in Somalia, as in other developing countries, and a main source of poverty is a lack of capital.
Somali’s poor possess far more capital than anybody has ever understood, but that capital is “dead” in the sense that it does not produce
additional capital. There are very few legally enforceable economic
transactions based on property rights because there are no addresses
attached to these assets. Somalia’s economy is almost exclusively extralegal. In the few parts of Somalia where law exists to some extent, the
citizens do not trust the law or the government that enforces it. The
extra-legal capital in Somalia is estimated to be about 200 percent of
GDP, or $12 billion. Like the situation in other developing countries,
extra-legality has always been the norm in Somalia and has accelerated
since the collapse of the formal system in 1991.57
Many Somali citizens are entrepreneurs who do not think that they
can benefit from the law due to entry and operational costs. The best
remedy is to reform the law and bring in a more “citizen-friendly”
law.58 These laws should be crafted with the help of the citizens; the
common people can identify what the problems are. Official law
should be aligned with how people actually live and work. Concerns
are primarily about how to gain legal access to property (real estate or
business) and how to leverage it. If government does not protect the
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common people’s property, it surrenders the function to “vigilantes”
and clan militias who seek the community’s allegiance. More importantly, as Hernando De Soto puts it, “Without a legal property system,
efforts to create a sustainable market economy are doomed to fail.”59 A
property rights system should be a component of any well-integrated
legal empowerment project.
For a legal empowerment project to work, the committee put forth
three main concepts. First, certain general conditions must be created.
The identity of the person as a citizen, as an asset holder, and as a
worker or a businessperson must be documented. The citizen must
also be given a voice through information and education as well as
through organizations and representation. Second, pillars of legal
empowerment must be set up. A system of rule to which all citizens
have access should be built. The principles enshrined in the law should
include property rights, labor rights, and business rights. Third, there
should be systemic change that leads to legal empowerment. For any
system, change leading to legal empowerment must be focused on
access to justice, assets, decent work, and markets. It must also be able
to provide protection and opportunity.
As the committee also suggested, legal empowerment may in fact
be smart politics and good economics. The decay and ultimate collapse
of Somalia’s governance system led to politics gravitating to informal
channels. Giving identity, voice, and representation to the poor may
lead to justice for all, while property rights may lead to functioning
markets, which may increase the productivity of assets.
Reviving the Somali economy requires building effective institutions. Property rights make transactions easier and cheaper. They also
make contracts enforceable. This may lead to the appearance of financial institutions like credit and insurance entities. Momentum should
come from citizens and grassroots organizations. In the end, reforms
should be based on local needs and conditions. Legal empowerment
must travel bottom-up. Powerful actors, including religious groups,
must be won over. There are no off-the-shelf blueprints for implementation. However, for this important paradigm change to occur, political
leadership is imperative. The government has to be run by presidents
and prime ministers in cooperation with ministers of finance, justice,
and labor—not by individual ministers.
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B. Strengthening Regional Ties and Instituting Open Trade Policies
Somalia’s immediate neighbors are Kenya to the southwest, Ethiopia
to the west, and Djibouti to the northwest. Both Yemen and Saudi Arabia are also accessible by sea. Thus, in essence, Somalia’s closest trading neighbors are Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
However, according to the CIA World Factbook for 2009, Somalia’s top
three import partners were Djibouti ($233.6 million), India ($95.2 million), and Kenya ($60.8 million), while the top three export partners
were the United Arab Emirates ($168.6 million), Yemen ($63 million),
and Saudi Arabia ($10.8 million).60 These statistics, however, do not
capture the large informal trade that takes place between Somalia and
neighboring countries like Ethiopia and Kenya. It is estimated that
Somalis consume about $200 million dollars annually in qat imported
from Kenya and Ethiopia.
As Uganda and Eritrea were so involved in the Somali conflict lately,
it could be instructive to include them in the list of Somalia’s political
neighbors. The total population of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,
and Uganda is over 160 million in an area of 2,750,000 square kilometers.61 The potential gains from trade between Somalia and its neighbors could be huge, yet their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita
are at the bottom of the world GDP rankings (Djibouti: $2,800; Ethiopia $900; Kenya: $1,500; Somalia: $600; and Uganda: $1,200). Trade
among these countries is hampered by the political instability in Somalia and the hot conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea and between Djibouti and Eritrea. Proxy wars among Somalia’s neighbors contribute
immensely to the continuation of Somalia’s political instability. At the
moment, the combined GDP of these countries is about $110 billion,
less than half of the tiny trading nation of the United Arab Emirates
($230 billion) with a population of 4.2 million and an area of 84,000
square kilometers. Except for Kenya, the inhabitants of these countries
live in abject poverty. They are members of the 49 Least Developed
Countries (LDC) in the world. (See Table 3.) Yemen, Somalia’s neighbor
on the other side of the Red Sea, is also on that LDC list. But as Table
3 shows, most of these countries are not landlocked and should have
benefited from trade with the outside world.
Given the relative availability of natural resources in these countries
and the strategic geographical location of the region with its access to
the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean, it is unfathomable
that the population in this region is as poor, if not poorer, than that in
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Table 3. List of the Least Developed Countries in the World62
Countries in the three continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean
Africa (33)
1 Angola
4 Burundi#
7 Comoros*
10 Equatorial Guinea
13 Gambia
16 Lesotho#
19 Malawi#
22 Mozambique
25 São Tomé and Príncipe*
28 Somalia ($600)
31 Uganda#

2 Benin
5 Central African Republic#
8 Democratic Republic of the Congo
11 Eritrea ($700)
14 Guinea
17 Liberia
20 Mali#
23 Niger#
26 Senegal
29 Sudan
32 United Republic of Tanzania

3 Burkina Faso#
6 Chad#
9 Djibouti ($2,800)
12 Ethiopia ($900)#
15 Guinea-Bissau*
18 Madagascar
21 Mauritania
24 Rwanda ($1,300)#
27 Sierra Leone
30 Togo
33 Zambia#

Asia (15)
1 Afghanistan#
4 Cambodia
7 Maldives*
10 Samoa*
13 Tuvalu*

2 Bangladesh
5 Kiribati*
8 Myanmar
11 Solomon Islands*
14 Vanuatu*

3 Bhutan#
6 Lao People’s Democratic Republic#
9 Nepal#
12 Timor-Leste*
15 Yemen

Latin America and the Caribbean (1)
1 Haiti *
* Also Small Island Developing States
#Also Land-Locked Developing Countries

landlocked countries. This region should be the fulcrum of international trade. It is now getting a lot of attention from the international
community, but not for trade. The world is spending billions of dollars
in fighting terrorism and piracy off the shores of Somalia. France and
the United States have semi-permanent military bases in the region.
The United Nations is financing international forces on the border
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is also financing Ugandan and Burundian forces to protect the weak TFG of Somalia from al-Shabaab and its
supporters. However, fostering trade and security cooperation in the
region is the only way around the current quagmire. Countries in the
region should spare no effort in bringing back stability and effective
governance to Somalia. The question is how? Should they get involved
militarily in Somalia? Are there any lessons that can be learned from
the disastrous 2006 Ethiopian military invasion of Somalia? Are the
Ugandan and Burundian forces currently in Somalia doing any better?
Is there a way around a military solution to Somalia’s instability? What
non-military role could the African Union, the Arab League, or countries in the region play? Finding answers to these questions is the key
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to generating stability in the region. The next question would be how
to set up flexible and open trade policies for these countries.
C. Summary Recommendations
1. Although past foreign aid did not achieve many of its stated objectives, for Somalia to become a functioning country again any reconstructive government will require a massive amount of financial
and strategic support from the international community in order to
rebuild national institutions.
2. The focus of foreign aid should be on legal empowerment of the
poor and on incorporating the extralegal assets, businesses, and
labour of the poor into the country’s formal economy.
3. A system of flexible decentralized governance is necessary to facilitate a bottom-up legal empowerment of the poor.
4. In order to create the proper conditions for governmentality and
good governance, the reconstructive government should attempt
to finance the majority of its operations with tax levies on residents
rather than foreign aid or debt.
5. In order to improve the government’s tax base, initial international
aid must include funds for setting up viable taxation systems and
projects that create employment and business activities.
6. To encourage trade, a Somali reconstructive government must
enter into trade agreements with its neighbours and other trading
partners to reduce tariffs and other border taxes.
7. Somalia’s foreign policy toward its neighbours must balance sovereignty with the flexibility necessary to optimize gainful trade.
*The author acknowledges research assistance by Christiene Merkel
and monetary support from CGA Alberta.
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